The canary in Minnesota’s coal mine was Brandon Ingram. In June, the New Orleans Pelicans traded one of their centers (Larry Nance Jr.) for Dejounte Murray, a player who replicates a significant chunk of what Ingram does offensively, and allowed the other (Jonas Valanciunas) to walk in free agency. They could not have more clearly telegraphed their intention with that decision. Murray was introduced to replace Ingram’s shot-making. Herb Jones and Trey Murphy are ready to play his position. The center position was left entirely vacant. The goal after acquiring Murray was to flip Ingram in a deal that included a replacement center. The Pelicans were more than justified in assuming such a deal would be out there. It’s not usually hard to trade 27-year-old wings who have made an All-Star team.
It’s September and Brandon Ingram is still a Pelican, and money is the simplest reason why. Ingram is an impending 2025 free agent that is eligible for an extension. It doesn’t make sense for New Orleans to pay him, but the rest of the market is scared to do so as well. Before the 2023 CBA, it was the sort of contract you offered thoughtlessly. It was the Zach LaVine or Bradley Beal max, a decision to retain an asset regardless of price. But in the new world? No way. Ingram is too flawed. His defense and playmaking are too inconsistent. His shot selection is all wrong. The injuries come too frequently. You can’t pay a $35 million player $50 million. It’s a non-starter, no matter how excited most teams would be just to have a $35 million player. That’s how a 27-year-old All-Star became nearly untradeable overnight.
Karl-Anthony Towns is a 28-year-old former All-Star. He’s gotten there several times more than Ingram has and ranked 12 spots above him on the CBS Sports top 100 rankings. But unlike Ingram, he doesn’t want the hefty contract. He already has it. He’s owed another $220 million over the next four seasons. He’s a better player at a less valuable position, and he’s a year older. He’s coming off of an inconsistent playoff run in which he had more games below 20 points (nine) than above (seven). He’s never been a good defender. He fouls too much. He is, in short, a risk. He wasn’t a risk the Timberwolves could afford to keep taking. They could not afford to get Ingram’d.
If push comes to shove, the Pelicans can let Ingram walk. They don’t have to pay him, as wasteful as sacrificing such an asset would be. The Timberwolves didn’t have that option. They had a four-year super max contract on a balance sheet that simply could not sustain it. Anthony Edwards is about to start a Rose Rule max contract, which opens at 30% of the salary cap. Rudy Gobert is at the end of the super max deal he signed in Utah, and before the Towns trade, he had Minnesota over a barrel. With a 2025-26 player option, he holds the power to significantly lower their luxury tax bill and perhaps knock them down an apron tier… if they’re willing to make him whole long term. Jaden McDaniels is underpaid relative to his market value, but he’s still making starter money. Naz Reid is making high-end bench money now, but when he opts out next summer, he’ll get starter money too. The Timberwolves have grown so prohibitively expensive over the past few years that this balance sheet could really only be justified by a championship.
Maybe Minnesota would have won the 2025 championship with Towns. The odds were against that no matter how much faith you had in their roster. There’s an inherent randomness to winning it all. Players get hurt. Matchups work against you. Shots you normally make don’t go in. Towns knows this well. He shot 3-of-22 from 3-point range in the first three games of the Western Conference Finals, all single-digit losses. Minnesota’s likeliest 2025 outcome was losing after a round or two in the postseason. Another 3-of-22 stretch might have made Towns completely untradeable at this price point.
What happens to Minnesota then? They’re suddenly allowed one more second apron season in the next four before their frozen draft picks start moving to the bottom of the first round. Do they let the younger Reid walk? Do they jettison McDaniels? The two of them together won’t make what Towns makes over the next few years. Edwards is the face of the franchise. He’s obviously bulletproof. Gobert is the foundation of the team’s defensive identity, and that player option at least allows the Timberwolves a bit of control over how they handle their balance sheet over the next few years. It was going to come down to trading Towns, who might not have been tradeable, or trading the role players, which would have deprived the younger Edwards of long-term running mates and the team of the depth and versatility it is going to need to contend. No outcome there is favorable.
So Minnesota swallowed hard and moved proactively. They traded Towns from a relative position of strength. Did he net the monster package he might’ve had he been moved a year or two earlier? No, but Minnesota turned him into a cheaper forward of a similar archetype and very valuable role player for a needed niche. Donte DiVincenzo could be a core player in Minnesota for years. Julius Randle could be a free agent in 2025. If he works out? The Timberwolves can re-sign him knowing the consequences. If he doesn’t? Let him walk for tax savings, or trade his salary slot into something that makes more sense.
In the deal, the Timberwolves acquired the 2025 protected Pistons pick, which could provide much-needed support for the team in the future. This pick, even if it remains with the Timberwolves, will offer valuable resources at a lower cost over the coming years.
The Knicks demonstrated strategic planning by structuring their finances to accommodate the Towns contract without overpaying for players like Jalen Brunson. This financial foresight allowed them to trade for Mikal Bridges and anticipate the costs of extending him. By staying under the hard cap, the Knicks have positioned themselves to maximize their current roster for the next four to five years, unlike the Timberwolves who may have had a shorter window of opportunity.
The uncertainty surrounding the ownership of the Timberwolves adds another layer of complexity to their financial decisions. With potential changes in ownership, the team’s ability to sustain high luxury tax bills remains in question. President Tim Connelly’s contract situation further complicates matters, as he may prefer to wait for clarity on ownership before committing long-term. The financial implications of maintaining a competitive team in a challenging NBA landscape are significant, especially for a historically frugal franchise like the Timberwolves.
By trading away their max-contract player before facing potential financial constraints, the Timberwolves have positioned themselves for future flexibility. This strategic move aligns with a new trend in the NBA where teams must carefully manage their finances to navigate the evolving landscape of player contracts and team building. Other teams, like the Nuggets and Bulls, may soon face similar decisions regarding their own max-contract players, highlighting the shifting dynamics of player retention and financial responsibility in the league.
Overall, the Timberwolves’ decision to trade their star player reflects a blend of financial prudence and basketball strategy. By sacrificing short-term success for long-term flexibility, they have embraced the challenges of building a sustainable contender in a competitive league where financial decisions carry as much weight as on-court performance. The sentence has already been rewritten.